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In comparison to qubit-based protocols, qudit-based quantum key distribution (QKD) ones gen-
erally allow two cooperative parties to share unconditionally secure keys under a higher channel
noise. However, it is very hard to prepare and measure the required quantum states in qudit-based
protocols in general. One exception is the recently proposed highly error tolerant qudit-based proto-
col known as the Chau15 [1]. Remarkably, the state preparation and measurement in this protocol
can be done relatively easily since the required states are phase encoded almost like the diagonal
basis states of a qubit. Here we report the first proof-of-principle demonstration of the Chau15
protocol. One highlight of our experiment is that its post-processing is based on practical one-way
manner, while the original proposal in Ref. [1] relies on complicated two-way post-processing, which
is a great challenge in experiment. In addition, by manipulating time-bin qudit and measurement
with a variable delay interferometer, our realization is extensible to qudit with high-dimensionality
and confirms the experimental feasibility of the Chau15 protocol.
Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD)
allows two distant peers Alice and Bob to share se-
cret key bits through a quantum channel which is
accessed by a malicious eavesdropper Eve [2, 3]. In a
typical QKD protocol, Alice encodes random classi-
cal bits into quantum states, and sends them to Bob,
who measures the incoming quantum states to de-
code Alice’s classical bits. Then by classical commu-
nications and random sampling, Alice and Bob can
obtain raw key bits, whose error rate can be also es-
timated. Finally, by classical post-processing, Alice
and Bob can generate secret key bits. The most com-
monly used QKD protocol is the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol [2] combined with the decoy
states method [4–6]. In the past decade, tremendous
progresses in experimental decoy states BB84 have
been achieved [7–13]. Lately, several novel QKD pro-
tocols have been proposed [1, 14–16]. Among these
protocols, measurement-device-independent (MDI)-
QKD [14] is immune to all detector-side-channel at-
tacks and have been proven to be a feasible QKD
scheme [17–21]. And the round-Robin-differential-
phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol features that moni-
toring signal disturbance can be bypassed [16], thus
becomes another hot topic. In the RRDPS protocol,
Alice has to prepare trains of pulses each consisting
of L pulses. In the simple case that each train con-
tains only one photon, the secret key rate R of the
RRDPS protocol in the one-way classical commu-
nication setting equals 1− h2(ebit)− h2(1/(L− 1)),
where ebit is the bit error rate of the raw key [16]. In
other words, the RRDPS protocol can tolerate much
higher bit error rate of the raw key than the BB84
protocol when L is sufficiently large. However, im-
plementing the RRDPS protocol for large L posts a
great experimental challenge. In spite of the exper-
imental difficulty, several experimental demonstra-
tions of RRDPS protocol have been reported [22–
25].
Inspired by the RRDPS protocol, Chau recently
proposed a novel QKD protocol [1], called the
Chau15 protocol, which can tolerate very high er-
ror rate and has a simpler implementation than
the RRDPS protocol. In the Chau15 protocol, for
each trial Alice randomly picks two distinct num-
bers i, j from the set {1, . . . , L} and a raw key bit
k ∈ {0 ≡ +, 1 ≡ −}, then prepares a quantum state∣∣ψ±ij
〉
= (|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2 according to the value of k
used. That is to say, Alice encodes each raw bit in
the phase between the two time bins |i〉 and |j〉. Al-
ice sends
∣∣ψkij
〉
to Bob, who then randomly picks two
distinct numbers m,n in {1, . . . , L} and measures
the incoming photon along {|ψ±mn〉}. Bob records
his raw key bit as 0 or 1 according to the measure-
ment result should the detector clicks. Repeating
above steps for sufficient times, Alice and Bob an-
nounce their i, j and m,n for each trial and only
retain the raw key bits correspond to the cases that
{i, j} = {m,n} as their sifted key bits. In Ref. [1],
Chau proved that secret key bits can be generated
when the error rate of sifted key bits is very high.
It is remarkable that this scheme can tolerate up to
50% error rate provided that L = 2p for some integer
p > 2.
It is instructive to realize the Chau15 protocol ex-
perimentally. One challenge is that one must pre-
pare and measure certain high-dimensional quantum
states, namely, qudits, in the Chau15 protocol al-
though preparing and measuring these special qudit
states are less complicated that those for a general
qudit state. Another challenge is that the two-way
classical communication post-processing method re-
ported in Ref. [1] is both rather complicated and of
low yield. Here, we first present a new security proof
of the Chau15 protocol based on standard one-way
communication plus a simple secret key rate formula
for any integer L > 4 rather than only for L in the
form 2p. Then, we report a proof-of-principle exper-
imental demonstration of the Chau15 protocol. In
this experiment, we encode the qudit based on quan-
tum superposition of time-bin and measurement is
performed with the help of a variable delay inter-
ferometer [24]. As far as we know, this is the first
experiment of the Chau15 protocol.
Security proof of the Chau15 protocol for arbitrary
L > 4 with one-way communication. We first con-
sider the case of an ideal single photon sourceand
ideal detectors. Since the protocol is permutation-
ally symmetric, quantum de Finetti theorem [26] im-
plies that we only need to consider the security under
Eve’s general collective attack in the form
UEve|i〉|E00〉 =
L∑
j=0
cij |j〉|Eij〉, (1)
where |Eij〉 is the quantum state of Eve’s ancilla,
{|Eij〉} is a set of basis for Eve’s ancilla, 〈Eij |Eil〉 =
δjl. Without loss of generality, we assume cij > 0
and
∑N
j=0 c
2
ij = 1.
Denote the probability that Bob obtains |ψ±mn〉
conditioned on the facts that Alice prepares her state
as
∣∣ψ±ij
〉
and Bob tried to project the state along
|ψ±mn〉 by p(m,n|i, j). In other words, p(m,n|i, j) is
the chance that a quantum state in Hilbert space
spanned by {|i〉, |j〉} is transformed into a space
spanned by {|m〉, |n〉}.
In the Supplemental Material, we show that Eve’s
information on all sifted key bits is given by
IAE 6 h2(
∑
i<j,m<n,m,n6=i,j p(m,n|i, j)
(L− 2)(L− 3)∑i<j p(i, j|i, j)
). (2)
For easy use by experimentalists, we define the mean
counting rate Q =
∑
i<j p(i, j|i, j)/
(
L
2
)
and Q′ =∑
i<j,m<n,m,n6=i,j p(m,n|i, j)/(
(
L
2
)(
L−2
2
)
) (where
(
x
y
)
is the bionomial coefficient), then we have
IAE 6 h2(
Q
2Q′
). (3)
Finally, the secret key rate per sifted key bit is given
by R = 1 − h2(E) − IAE , where E is the bit error
rate of the sifted key bit.
We remark that our asymptotic bound of IAE
holds even when (i, j) is biased distributed. As
long as the probability for Bob to measure any
one of the (i, j) pairs is non-zero, we could then
estimate p(m,n|i, j) to arbitrarily good precision
given a sufficiently long key [27]. With the help
of decoy states [4–6], this security proof can be
adepted in real-life implementations with weak co-
herent sources. And in the Supplementary Material,
we extend our analysis to the case of finite key length
with decoy states.
FIG. 1. Experimental setup for the Chau15 experiment.
IM: intensity modulator; PM: phase modulator; VA:
variable attenuator; CIR: circulator; OS: optical switch;
BS: beam splitter; SPD: single photon detector.
Experimental setup and results. We performed the
experiment using the setup in Fig. 1. Alice con-
sists of a continuous wave (CW) laser at 1550.12 nm,
three intensity modulators (IM) and two phase mod-
ulators (PM). IM1 modulates the CW light into a co-
herent pulse train with a temporal width of 96 ps and
a repetition rate of 1GHz. IM2 chops this pulse train
into packets of 5 time slots (5 ns), in which only two
random pulses indexed by i and j (i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
and i < j) are allowed to pass. IM3 is employed to
implement the decoy states method [4–6], in which
2
each packet is randomly modulated into signal, de-
coy1, or decoy2 states. PM1 encodes key bits by
modulating phase {−pi
2
, pi
2
} on pulses for each packet,
and PM2 adds random global phase on each packet.
Finally, the variable attenuator (VA) attenuates the
average photon numbers per packet to the single
photon level. The output quantum state prepared by
Alice can be expressed as |ψij〉 = (|i〉 + eiφ|j〉)/
√
2,
where φ ∈ {0, pi} is the phase difference between the
ith and jth pulses.
Bob mainly consists of a 1 GHz, 1−4 bit variable-
delay Faraday-Michelson interferometer (FMI) and
a double-channel single-photon detector (SPD). By
setting the delay to r, the variable-delay FMI makes
the ith pulse interfere with the jth pulse if j = i+ r.
Two channels of the SPD are connected to each of
the output ports of the FMI, and which channel
records a detection event depends on the phase dif-
ference φ. Through recording a click event in the
interference slot, Bob fulfills the quantum projection
into
∣∣ψ±ij
〉
.
To realize the variable-delay interferometer, the
same structure as in Ref. [24] is employed here. Each
of the two arms of this interferometer has two fiber
delays, and the delay is chosen by a bidirectional
NanoSpeed 1× 2 optical switch (OS). The arm with
the {0, 1} delays is named the short arm, and the
arm with the {2, 4} delays is named the long arm.
The chosen delays of the long and short arms are
denoted as x ∈ {2, 4} and y ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
Then, the delay of the interferometer is r = x−y. In
total, the variable-delay FMI can achieve fast switch
among 1−4 ns delay values. The piezoelectric trans-
ducer (PZT) cylinder wrapped with 2 m fiber was
used to obtain high precision of each delay, and also
to compensate the phase shift of the interferome-
ter. The insertion loss (IL) of the interferometer
(including the IL of the circulator) is about 2.0 dB,
and the values of each delay are almost the same.
This variable-delay interferometer is polarization in-
sensitive owning to Faraday mirrors and features an
average extinction ratio of 23 dB.
Photons from the variable-delay FMI were de-
tected by the double-channel SPD, and finally
recorded by a time-to-digital converter (TDC). Both
channels of SPD are based on InGaAs/InP avalanche
photodiodes and employ the sine-wave filtering
method [28]. The first channel features a detection
efficiency of 22.1% (down to 20.8% if including 2→ 3
IL of CIR), a dark count rate of 1.5× 10−6 per gate,
and after-pulse probability of 0.8%. The second
channel features a detection efficiency of 20.9%, a
dark count rate of 1.1×10−6 per gate, and after-pulse
probability of 1.1%. The TDC not only recorded
signals but also set measurement time window. The
value of the time window was set to 800 ps during
the experiment, and this setting reduced the average
effective detection efficiency of two channels of the
SPD to 20.4%, while the total dark count was just
a little less than 2.6× 10−6 per gate.
Based on the experimental parameters listed
above, the performance of Chau15 system was es-
timated and all parameters were optimized by max-
imizing the secret key rate. Setting the intensity
and probability of one signal (µ) and two decoy
states (ν1 and ν2) close to the optimal ones, we
measured the mean yield Q and Q′, and error rate
of the signal state Eµ at four fiber lengths: 50,
100, 130 and 150 km. When Alice prepares laser
pulse at time slots i and j, Bob gets the mean yield
Q =
∑
i<j p(i, j|i, j)/
(
5
2
)
if he also gets interference
output between these two time slots, and Bob gets
the mean yield Q′ =
∑
i<j,m<n p(m,n|i, j)/(
(
5
2
)(
3
2
)
)
if he obtains interference output between time slots
m and n (m,n 6= i, j). The experimental results
are listed in Table I. The last set of data over 50 km
length fiber is obtained in high error rate case, which
may happen in the ultrahigh speed case or harsher
environment. In the experiment, we intentionally
distorted the modulating signal on PM1 to get error
rate over 20%.
Secret keys can still be extracted at a transmis-
sion distance of 150 km in the asymptotic case (Rinf
when Alice sends infinite packets), which is compa-
rable with the commonly used BB84 protocol. The
secret key rate per packet is at 10−3 level over 50 km
length fiber, which is lower than BB84 protocol, but
if the biased-basis method was employed in Chau15
protocol, its secret key rate is also comparable with
BB84 in the asymptotic case. When the error rate
exceeds 20%, Chau15 protocol can still get secret key
rate at 10−5 level over 50 km length fiber. There-
fore, Chau15 protocol can outperform BB84, espe-
cially in the high error rate case. And, Chau15 pro-
tocol can also outperform RRDPS. The maximum
transmission distance of the L = 5 RRDPS exper-
iment system is less than 50 km using supercon-
ducting SPDs [23], while in our L = 5 Chau15 sys-
tem, the transmission distance could reach 150 km
with InGaAs/InP SPD. The tolerant error rate of
the L = 65 RRDPS experiment system with the
weak coherent source is less than 17% [24], while
3
TABLE I. Experimental results. The length of fiber (l), intensity (Int.) and probability (P ) of one signal (µ) and
two decoy states (ν1 and ν2), the mean yield (Q and Q
′), error rate of the signal state (Eµ), and the secret key rate
per packet(Rinf for infinite packet number and Rf for finite packet number). The last set of data over 50 km fiber is
obtained in high error rate case. The total number of packets sent from Alice is N = 3× 1011, the failure probability
is set to be 10−10, and parameters are optimized.
l(km) Int.(ph/packet) P (%) Q Q′ Eµ(%) Rinf Rf
50
µ 0.66 97.81 4.36× 10−3 1.10× 10−5
1.83 1.45× 10−3 1.39× 10−3ν1 0.05 1.40 3.33× 10−4 3.23× 10−6
ν2 0.0016 0.79 1.34× 10−5 2.61× 10−6
100
µ 0.62 94.64 4.05× 10−4 3.36× 10−6
2.16 1.20× 10−4 1.06× 10−4ν1 0.10 3.36 6.75× 10−5 2.71× 10−6
ν2 0.0015 2.00 3.58× 10−6 2.60× 10−6
130
µ 0.57 87.74 9.04× 10−5 2.76× 10−6
3.21 1.73× 10−5 1.28× 10−5ν1 0.14 7.52 2.42× 10−5 2.63× 10−6
ν2 0.0014 4.74 2.81× 10−6 2.60× 10−6
150
µ 0.50 36.12 3.31× 10−5 2.64× 10−6
5.68 4.32× 10−7 −−ν1 0.14 37.76 1.11× 10−5 2.61× 10−6
ν2 0.0012 26.12 2.67× 10−6 2.60× 10−6
50
µ 0.07 84.45 4.65× 10−4 3.47× 10−6
20.32 2.40× 10−5 1.70× 10−5ν1 0.035 10.40 2.34× 10−4 3.03× 10−6
ν2 0.0002 5.15 3.73× 10−6 2.60× 10−6
the value can exceed 20% in Chau15 system even
L = 5. These results verified that Chau15 protocol
has good comprehensive performances on maximum
transmission distance, secret key rate and tolerant
error rate with small L.
Nevertheless, the secret key rate per second of our
proof-of-principle experimental realization is limited
by the optical switch, whose switching speed in the
setup is about 100 ns. This limitation can be over-
came by employing the passive scheme based on
1 × (L − 1) BS (just like [23]), or slow basis choice
method [29], or the development of optical switch
techniques in the near future.
Another difficulty to overcome is to obtain rel-
atively small yield Q′, which plays an important
role to estimate Eve’s information (see Eq.(3)). The
smaller Q′ Bob measures, the more key rate Alice
and Bob can share. Under ideal conditions, the
yield Q′ should be equal to the dark count of the
SPD. However, the experimental results show that
the yield Q′ is larger than the dark count rate of
the SPD, especially at short transmission distance.
To offer an intuitive impression, we define the count
ratio Cm as the count at time slot i to the count
at time slot m 6= i, j for the output packets from
Alice. Q′ can be evaluated by the mean value of
Cm. The sources contributing to relatively large Q
′
mainly include the limited extinction ratio of IM2,
the dark count, after pulses and time jitter of the
SPD. Therefore, Bob’s SPD (without interferome-
ter) is employed to directly measure the outputs of
Alice. Four kinds of typical outputs with i = 1 (12,
13, 14, and 15) are shown in Fig. 2, the time win-
dow of TDC is not set for this measurement. The
worst case corresponds to the outputs of j = i + 2.
Taking 13 output of Alice for example, the count
ratio C2 is only 280.
Conclusion. In summary, we developed a security
proof for the Chau15 protocol with one-way post-
processing, which facilitates the secret key genera-
tion in real-life situation. In our experiment, the
qubit-like qudits are prepared by manipulating time-
bin of photon and measured by a variable delay in-
terferometer. Our demonstration exhibits the fine
feasibility and high error-rate tolerance of the novel
Chau15 protocol and sheds light on QKD experi-
ments with high-dimensionality.
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